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National regulatory authorities (NRAs) attempt to encourage participation in spectrum 
assignments by enhancing entrants’ likelihood of success. The question this study addresses 
is: Can NRA policy tools really affect the probability an entrant wins a 3G spectrum 
licence? In particular, the econometric analysis allows consideration of whether licence 
concession or mode of assignment encourages entry. The study finds that auction 
assignment processes only slightly increase the probability of entry, whilst price and 
quantity concessions have no impact. 
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Electromagnetic spectrum is the conduit for the provision of wireless communication 
services. Granting rights to spectrum is a two-stage process. First, spectrum bands are 
allocated by international institutions such as the International Telecommunication Union 
(ITU). Second, national regulatory authorities (NRAs) assign spectrum within countries to 
mobile network operators (MNOs) (Gruber, 2005). 
 
Gruber (2007) argues that benefits arising from new MNO entry (firms that do not operate 
2G networks in the country assigning spectrum) include lower retail prices and improved 
service quality. Hoppe et al. (2006) study the relationship between the number of 3G 
spectrum licences offered and ex post competition (or market structure proxied by the 
number of active firms). They find incumbents more willing to deter entry the greater the loss 
of potential profit. Interestingly, the probability of entry increases with incumbent numbers.
1 
 
Importantly, NRAs sometimes employ policy instruments in an attempt to influence ex post 
market structure.
2 For instance, licences are set aside for entrants or they receive bidding 
credits, while incumbents’ purchasing capacity is limited. The above free-rider problem 
provides a rationale for reserving licences beyond just attracting more entrants (viz., it 
reduces the incumbent’s private incentive to prevent entry).
3  Also, bidding credits are 
intended to enhance potential entrants’ willingness to pay for licences. However, to assure 
entry the bidding credit must raise the entrant’s willingness to pay above the incumbent’s pre-
emptive willingness to pay (Hoppe et al., 2006; Gruber, 2007; Azacis and Burguet, 2008; 
Ansari and Munir, 2008).
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Other policy tools available to NRAs to encourage entry include: (a) the mode of licence 
assignment (whether by auction or beauty contest); and (b) the number of licences to be 
awarded (in excess of incumbent operator numbers) (Jehiel and Moldovanu, 2003).
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Whilst the above arguments are compelling (and generally accepted), somewhat surprisingly, 
there is an absence of empirical research establishing whether in fact NRA policy tools 
(including the mode of assignment) influence the probability that new entrants win 3G 
spectrum licences. The resolution of this question is fundamentally important given industry 
convergence, growth in demand for data services and the spectrum dividend made available 
from the ‘switch off’ of analogue networks. Most likely, this paucity of empirical analysis 
results from data limitations. Namely, available data sets typically do not include information 
on whether potential entrants decide to bid or not. 
 
That is, cogent econometric analysis requires that the potential new entrant’s decision making 
process on participation is incorporated into the estimating equations, i.e., that self-selection 
in the participation decision is addressed. Potential new entrants initially must assess their 
willingness to apply (and pay) for spectrum and then, whether to submit bids. If potential new 
entrants perceive a disadvantage relative to incumbent operators, they might not bother to bid 
at all, or they might try to form consortia with incumbents. Both types of behaviour are 
observed in spectrum assignments (Jehiel and Moldovanu, 2003: 286). 
 
The econometric analysis employed obtains consistent parameter estimates by treating the 
selection issue as an omitted variable problem. The approach is an application of two-stage 
residual inclusion procedures, where the first-stage estimation number of bidders equation is 
specified as negative binomial. The residuals from this regression are included as arguments 2 
 
in the second-stage binomial probit entry equation. Importantly the approach is applicable to 
a wide range of selection problems where data availability is limited. 
 
For estimation, 3G spectrum assignments information are sourced from the DotEcon 
Spectrum Awards Database (2008). These data consist of descriptive statistics for 49 national 
award processes covering 141 licences for the period 1999–2008. Only licences for which 
both incumbents and entrants may bid are considered. The estimation results show that 
auction assignment processes enhance the probability of entry, while price and quantity 
concessions are ineffective. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses policy tools developed by NRAs to 
encourage market entry. Section 3 outlines the econometric procedures. In Section 4, 
variables used in the empirical analysis are defined, and the expected signs of the policy-
relevant coefficients are indicated. Section 5 describes the market and licence conditions that 
entrants typically encounter. Section 6 presents estimation results, while Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Policy Tools and Market Entry, 1999–2008 
 
Licence assignments are mostly made by auction or administrative tender (beauty contest). In 
auctions operators ‘simply’ price-bid for spectrum. Conversely, beauty contests require 
operators to bid for spectrum via multi-dimensional plans that include intended spectrum use, 
network coverage and pricing. Table 1 shows that 29 national assignments are by beauty 
contest, while 20 are by auction. These data also indicate that, after controlling for the 
number of licences offered by mode, entry is more common in auctions (30% via auction 
versus 25% via beauty contest). 
Table 1. Entry by Assignment Mode 
Assignment Mode  Number  Entrant-Licence Ratio 
    Mean  Std. Dev. 
       
Auction  20  0.30  0.36 
       
Beauty Contest  29  0.25  0.35 
       
Sample  49  0.27  0.35 
       
Note: The mean Entrant-Licence ratios by assignment mode are not significantly different from zero. 
 
Notably, the environment in which licences are offered is affected by NRA positions on 
encouraging entry. In particular, NRAs intend to encourage entry by: (a) making available 
more licences than incumbent operators; (b) withholding licences for entrants; and (c) 
offering entrant-only concessions. More precisely, entry concessions include targeted 
spectrum and spectrum price discounts. 
 
Table 2 lists the number of excess licences and national market entry for 1999–2008. Of 49 
national assignment processes, in 25 cases excess licences equal the number of entrants. In 
the remaining 24 assignments either the number of excess licences is greater than entrant 
number (9 cases); or the number of entrants exceeds excess licences (15 cases). Table 3 
indicates that entrants receive concessions to encourage entry in only 6 (of 52) processes. 
However, in these assignments only Greece did not award an entrant a licence.
6 Additionally, 
Table 4, lists the number (and percentage) of withheld licences by World Bank national 
income classification for 1999–2008. Withholding licences is uncommon (8 of 116 licence 
assignments), and only applied in High Income countries. 
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Table 2. Excess Licences and New Entrants by Assignment, 1999–2008 
Country  Year  Excess Licences 
a  Market Entrants 
b 
       
Finland  1999  0  0 
Austria  2000  2  2 
Germany  2000  2  2 
Italy  2000  0  0 
Japan  2000  0  0 
Korea Republic  2000  0  0 
Netherlands  2000  0  0 
Norway  2000  1  1 
Poland  2000  2  0 
Portugal  2000  1  1 
Spain  2000  1  1 
Sweden  2000  1  2 
Switzerland  2000  1  1 
UK  2000  0  0 
Belgium  2001  0  0 
Czech Republic  2001  1  0 
Denmark  2001  0  1 
France  2001  1  0 
Greece  2001  0  0 
Israel  2001  1  0 
Liechtenstein  2002  2  0 
New Zealand  2001  1  2 
Singapore  2001  0  0 
Slovenia  2001  1  0 
France  2002  1  0 
Ireland  2002  0  1 
Latvia  2002  0  0 
Luxembourg  2002  1  1 
Malaysia  2002  0  0 
Slovak Republic  2002  0  0 
Taiwan  2002  1  2 
Estonia  2003  1  0 
Luxembourg  2003  0  1 
Croatia  2004  0  1 
Hungary  2004  1  0 
Romania  2004  0  0 
Bulgaria  2005  0  0 
Denmark  2005  0  1 
Latvia  2005  0  1 
Poland  2005  1  1 
Egypt  2006  0  1 
Georgia  2006  0  2 
Indonesia  2006  0  1 
Malaysia  2006  1  1 
Philippines  2006  1  1 
Slovenia  2006  0  1 
Ireland  2007  0  1 
Russia  2007  0  0 
Slovenia  2008  0  1 
       
Total    26  31 
       
Note: (a) Calculated as number of licences offered for which both entrants and incumbents can apply in excess of 








Table 3. Entrant Concessions, 1999–2008 
Country  Year  Assignment Mode  Concession 
       
Italy  2000  Auction  s 
       
UK  2000  Auction  s, p 
       
Greece  2001  Auction  s 
       
Israel  2001  Auction  p 
       
       
Ireland  2002  Beauty Contest  s, p 
b 
       
Slovak Republic  2002  Beauty Contest  s 
       
Note: (a) s indicates additional spectrum is made available only to entrants while p indicates the spectrum price 
is discounted to entrants; (b) The Irish entrant price advantage is via awarding additional points to entrants. 
Source: Börgers and Dustmann (2003), Analysys (2007), DotEcon Spectrum Awards Database (2008). 
 
 
Table 4. Withheld Licences by National Income, 1999–2008 
Income Classification  Awarded Licences  Withheld Licences  Entrants 
    Number  %  Number  % 
           
High  116  8 
b  7  30  26 
Upper-Middle  22  0  0  4  18 
Lower-Middle  11  0  0  5  45 
           
Sample  149  8  5  39  25 
       
Note: (a) World Bank income classification; (b) Belgium withheld a licence but eventually awarded it to an 
incumbent due to a lack of interest. 
 
 
The relationship between entry and excess licences is explored via the joint probabilities 
reported in Table 5. The table shows that entrants win licences when no excess licences are 
available in 9% of cases, compared to 13% when excess licences are offered. Table 6 reports 
the conditional probability of entry with excess licences at 0.25. Further, the probability that 
there is entry when there are no excess licences is 0.18. These probabilities indicate that 
market entry occurs when incumbent numbers are greater than or equal to available licences, 
and that the presence of excess licences is not a guarantee for entry. For mode of assignment, 
Table 7 shows the entry probability is marginally higher for auction processes. 
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Table 5. Joint Probability 
Event  Probability 
   
Prob(ENTRANT   EXCESS)    0.13 
   
Prob(ENTRANT  ~EXCESS)    0.09 
   
Prob(INCUMBENT  EXCESS)    0.40 
   
Prob(INCUMBENT   ~EXCESS)    0.38 
   
Total  1.00 
   
Note: Data is in binary form. When entrants exceed one, ENTRANT = 1, and 0 otherwise. When excess 
licences exceed zero, EXCESS = 1; 0 otherwise. 
 
 
Table 6. Entry Probability Conditional on Excess Licences 
Event  Probability 
 
Prob(ENTRANT  EXCESS)  0.25 
 
Prob(ENTRANT  ~ EXCESS)  0.18 
 
Note: Data is in binary form. When entrants exceeds one, ENTRANT = 1; 0 otherwise. When excess licences 
exceed zero, EXCESS = 1; otherwise. 
 
 
Table 7. Entry Probability Conditional on Auction Process 
Event  Probability 
 
Prob(ENTRANT  AUCTION)   0.23 
 
Prob(ENTRANT  ~ AUCTION)  0.21 
 
Note: Data is in binary form. When entrants exceeds one, ENTRANT = 1; 0 otherwise. When spectrum is 
assigned by auction, AUCTION = 1; 0 otherwise.  
 
 
To summarise, making excess licences available is an often used tool, whilst withholding 
licences (and awarding other concessions) is reasonably uncommon. Further, market entry 
mostly occurs in the absence of policy. Moreover, when these policies are in effect often 
entry does not occur, and other factors affect the entry probability. 
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3. Econometric Method 
 
Following Greene (2008: 884), the most simple sample selection (or incidental truncation) 
equation is: 
 
* , ii zu 
'
i w δ   (1) 
 
with the equation of primary interest given by: 
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where  i y  is observed only if  
* 0. i z   The standard result is that with  i u  and  i   distributed 
bivariate normal with zero means and correlation  ,   then: 
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ii i w δw δ w δ  Clearly, least squares regression 
of the licensee being an entrant or not produces inconsistent estimates of β  when  the 
estimation omits the independent variable  . 	  
 
That is, consistent parameter estimates of the sample selection model require estimation by 
maximum likelihood or Heckman (1979) two-step estimation procedure (see Greene: 888).
7 
However, the approach is not feasible as the current sample does not contain data on the 
selection mechanism variable, i.e., whether a potential entrant decides to bid or not. With the 
sample containing data only on bidders an alternative approach must be sought. 
 
Accordingly, the approach adopted is to replace the independent variable 	  with a proxy. 
The proxy variable is sourced from a count model (negative binomial regression) explaining 
the number of bidders. The count model is suggested by De Silva et al. (2009) who explicitly 
recognise the sequential decision process of the bidders in their modelling, viz., that the 
decision whether or not to bid is made prior to deciding on a particular bid value. They report 
that as the number of bidders increases the probability of submitting a bid declines under both 
private and common value uncertainty.
8  Furthermore, Doyle (2009) argues that spectrum 
assignments involve a mix of private and common values.
9 
 
The method employed to estimate the model follows from Terza et al. (2008). Terza et al. 
compare the performance of alternative methods to address endogeneity in empirical 
research: two-stage predictor substitution (2SPS) and two-stage residual inclusion (2SRI). 
2SPS is the extension to non-linear models of linear two-stage least squares estimation. By 
contrast, in 2SRI in the second stage of estimation the first-stage residuals are included as 
additional regressors. Within a generic nonlinear framework, Terza et al. demonstrate that 
2SRI is consistent, while 2SPS is not.
10 Furthermore, they simulate several special cases to 
determine the magnitude and behaviour of bias resulting from the application of the 
alternative procedures. Of particular interest is the estimation of an (ordered) logit model with 
count-valued endogenous treatment. For this model, the 2SRI approach clearly outperforms 
the 2SPS estimation-based simulations in terms of the magnitude of the average treatment 
bias, and its diminution with increases in sample size. 7 
 
 
Next, the number of bidders equation is specified negative binomial. The negative binomial 
regression model is an extension of the Poisson regression model which allows the variance 
of the process to differ from the mean. The model arises from the specification of the mean 
i   as: 
  log log , ii i v     (4) 
 
where  exp( ) i v   is distributed gamma with unit mean and variance 
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where  /( ) ii     and  1/ 
  . The model has an overdispersion parameter 
  such that 
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Estimation is conducted via LIMDEP version 9.0 by maximum likelihood. 
 
The second-stage of the 2SRI estimator applies to the binomial probit model, viz. either the 
winning bidder is an entrant (1 ) Y   or an incumbent operator (0 ) Y   in the period is which 
the sample is obtained, so that 
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where  denotes the standard normal distribution. In addition to the observed values of the 
exogenous variables x also contains the residuals from the count data model. The simulated 
maximum likelihood estimator is asymptotically consistent as the number of observations and 
draws tend to infinity.
11 Within  this  framework  the  variances of the disturbances are 
normalised to unity. Additionally, standard errors are corrected for clustering in the sample.
12 
That is, the data set is partitioned into 49 (national spectrum assignments by year) mutually 
exclusive and exhaustive clusters. The corrected asymptotic covariance matrix is: 
 
    11 1
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where V  is the estimated asymptotic covariance matrix ignoring the clustering and  ij g  is the 
matrix of first derivatives of the log likelihood function for all model parameters for 
assignment i in cluster  j . 
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Greene (2008) constructs the marginal effects for the model as the coefficient vector 













βx ' β β
xx ' β
  (10) 
 
 
4. Data and Variables 
 
National 3G spectrum assignment data are sourced from the DotEcon Spectrum Awards 
Database (2008). DotEcon data records the name of the winning bidder, and characteristics of 
the licence and assignment process. These data are augmented with information obtained 
from operator, NRA and media Web sites. Particular information sought from this search 
concern whether the winning bid is by carriers that operate a network in the nation prior to 
the 3G spectrum assignment. To analyse market entry only processes in which both 
incumbents and entrants are able to bid are included. This treatment provides a sample of 141 
national licence awards from 49 assignment processes for the period 1999–2008. 
 
Table 8 and Table 9, respectively, present the definition, mean and standard deviation for the 
dependent and independent variables employed in the empirical analysis. The dependent 
variables for first-stage and second-stage estimation are respectively the numbers of bidders 
that contest for the licence (BIDDERS) and the discrete variable whether the licence is 
assigned to an entrant or not (ENTRANT). 
 
 
Table 8. Dependent Variable Summary Statistics, 1999–2008 
Variable  Definition  Mean  Std. Dev. 
       
BIDDERS  = Number of bidders contesting the spectrum licence  4.83  2.49 
       
ENTRANT  = 1, if licence is assigned to an entrant; = 0, otherwise  0.22  0.42 
       
 
 
Many variables potentially impact on the bidding probability and the entry probability. 
Variables contained in Table 9 measure entry incentives (entrant price concessions, entrant 
spectrum quantity concessions); assignment mode (auction or beauty contest); licence 
availability (excess licences, withheld licences); spectrum package attributes (population 
coverage obligation, licence duration, annual licence fees, upfront spectrum price, reserve 
price, time to achieve coverage obligation); and national economic and mobile market 
conditions (population density, national income, existing market structure). 
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Table 9. Independent Variable Summary Statistics, 1999–2008 
Variable  Definition  Mean  Std. Dev. 
       
Entry incentives     
       
  PCONC  = 1, if entrant price concession; = 0, otherwise  0.04  0.20 
       
  SCONC  = 1, if entrant spectrum quantity concession; = 0, otherwise  0.08  0.27 
       
Assignment mode     
       
  AUCTION  = 1, if licence assignment is via an auction; = 0, otherwise  0.49  0.50 
       
Licence availability     
       
  EXCESS  = Licences available minus incumbent operators  0.59  0.90 
       
  WITHHOLD  = Licences withheld for entrants in an assignment process  0.10  0.31 
       
Spectrum package attributes     
       
  COVER  = Population to be covered by the network (%)  0.46  0.36 
       
  DURATION  = Licence term (years)  16.91  4.08 
       
  FEE  = Annual fee ($US per 100 MHz per million population)  0.60  2.53 
       
  INITIAL  = Upfront payment $US million per MHz per million population  0.56  1.04 
       
  RESERVE  = Minimum allowable spectrum bid price (US$ millions)  183  580 
       
  SERVICE  COVERAGE / TIME (% per annum)  1.20  1.26 
       
  TIME  = Years to achieve network population coverage  3.45  2.68 
       
National economic and mobile market conditions     
       
  DENSITY  = National population per square kilometre  303  966 
       
  INCOME  = GDP per capita ($US)  1841  1270 
       
  MCOMP  = Inverse one plus number of facilities-based mobile operators  0.23  0.05 
       
 
 
The willingness of potential entrants to contest for licences (probability of bidding) is 
conditioned by macroeconomic variables, and generally applicable (to both entrants and 
incumbents) spectrum package attributes. Whether there are licences available beyond those 
likely to be contested by incumbents, and entry incentives (entrant spectrum price and 
quantity concessions), are included as explanatory variables. 
 
The primary equation of interest is the probability of entry. Of the macroeconomic and 
mobile market variables, higher population density lowers network deployment costs, and 
higher income translates into more potential expenditure for mobile services. Additionally, 
less competitive domestic mobile markets imply greater price-cost margins. NRAs determine 
the mode of assignment; the number and form in which licences are made available; financial 
and network coverage obligations of licence holders; and any incentives for potential entrants 
to bid. Of the generally applicable control variables, more ‘attractive’ licences typically have 
longer duration, less stringent network deployment obligations and more favourable financial 10 
 
commitments. As a consequence attractive licences are likely more contested and, certeris 
paribus, because of inherent bidding advantages (i.e., market knowledge and financial 
resources) incumbents disproportionally win these licences. Therefore, entry is likely 
associated with ‘unattractive’ licences. 
 
Furthermore, in response to the bidding dominance by incumbents, NRAs develop policy 
tools in an attempt to enhance the probability of entry. For instance, any excess or withheld 
licences are intended to create an incentive for potential entrants to bid. Additionally, 
spectrum price and quantity concessions are intended to create more level playing fields in 
the absence of set-aside licences. Finally, NRAs control the mode of assignment. Importantly, 
it is widely argued that auction assignment processes encourage entry. 
 
 
Table 10. Expected Impact on Entry of NRA Policy Tools 
Variable  Rationale  Expected Sign 
       
Assignment mode     
       
  AUCTION  Entry is more common via auction processes  Positive 
       
Licence availability     
       
  EXCESS  More licences better enable potential entrants to win licences  Positive 
       
  WITHHOLD  Withheld licences reduce competition for remaining spectrum  Negative 
       
Entry incentives     
       
  PCONC  Price concessions encourage entry  Positive 
       
  SCONC  Quantity concessions encourage entry  Positive 
       
 
5. Entrant Market and Licence Conditions 
 
With spectrum assignments embedded in administrative processes clearly not all assignments 
are equally attractive to bidders. An interesting question then is whether incumbents, driven 
by expected profit considerations (Klemperer, 2002: 177; Hope et al., 2006), mostly win 
licences in more attractive assignments. Such an outcome is equivalent to entrants mostly 
winning licences in relatively unattractive markets. Inspection of the sample data contained in 
Table 11 confirms that while entrants, on average, win licences in markets with higher 
national income (INCOME), population density (DENSITY) is lower. Furthermore, entrants 
generally win licences with more onerous conditions, viz., shorter licence duration 
(DURATION); higher annual fees (FEE); and less time to achieve coverage obligations 
(TIME). 
  11 
 
Table 11. Market and Licence Conditions by Entry 
Variable  Entrant  Incumbent  Desired Value 
       
National economic and mobile market conditions     
       
  DENSITY  142  348  High 
       
  INCOME  21,554  17,520  High 
       
  MCOMP  0.24  0.23  Low 
       
Spectrum package attributes     
       
  COVER  0.48  0.46  Low 
       
  DURATION  15.8  17.2  High 
       
  FEE  0.22  0.14  Low 
       
  INITIAL  0.42  0.60  Low 
       
  TIME  3.06  3.56  High 
 
 
6. Estimation Results 
 
In the first stage of the empirical analysis a count model (negative binomial regression) 
explaining the number of bidders is estimated. In the second stage of estimation the first-
stage residuals are included as an additional argument in the binomial probit entry model, 
thus addressing the omitted variable bias problem. Both models include a set of controls for 
entry incentives, licence availability, spectrum package attributes, and national economic and 
mobile market conditions. However, the two specifications differ. The bidding stage 
incorporates information important in deciding whether to bid, i.e., the annual licence fee 
(FEE) and minimum spectrum bid price (RESERVE). In the entry equation, variables 
included concern the assignment mode (AUCTION), whether licences are set aside for 
entrants (withheld from incumbents, WITHHOLD) and the upfront payment required for the 
licence (INITIAL). Finally, the first-stage residual (RESIDUAL) is added to the entry 
equation. A significant RESIDUAL coefficient supports the model specification. 
Table 12 reports the estimated bidding model from negative binomial regression. Estimation 
is by maximum likelihood procedures as outlined by Greene (2008: 911–915). Further, the 
likelihood test rejects the null hypothesis that explanatory variables do not impact on bidding. 
Additionally, the McFadden pseudo 
2 R  statistic is reported.
13 While the measure is not a 
direct counterpart to 
2 R  in  linear  models,  it  does  provide a useful summary measure 
(McFadden, 1973: 123). These data suggest that licence availability (EXCESS), spectrum 
package attributes (RESERVE and SERVICE) and national economic and market conditions 
(DENSITY and MCOMP) are particularly important for explaining the willingness to bid for 
spectrum. Table 12 contains parameter estimates, standard errors and t  statistics for the 
negative binomial model. Of particular interest is that the availability of excess licences 
(EXCESS) appears to encourage bidding (presumably by potential entrants), while entry 
incentives (PCONS and SCONC) have no effect. 




Table 12. Negative Binomial Regression Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
Category  Variable  Coefficient  Standard Error  t statistic  Marginal Effect 
           




  PCONC  –0.29899  0.38507  –0.776  –0.53649 




  EXCESS  0.38109***  0.08357  4.560  0.63418 
 
Spectrum package attributes 
 
  DURATION  –0.00852  0.01648  –0.517  –0.00201 
  FEE  –0.04456  0.17992  –0.248  –0.09776 
  RESERVE  –0.00034**  0.00018  –1.862  –0.00063 
  SERVICE  –0.13682**  0.05754  –2.378  –0.30918 
 
National economic conditions 
 
  DENSITY  –0.00073*  0.00040  –1.855  –0.00140 
  INCOME  0.00001  0.00000  1.099  0.00001 
  MCOMP  –3.86450**  1.57784  –2.449  –8.35749 
 
 
  Number of observations  141   
  McFadden pseudo 
2 R   0.120   
  Log likelihood  –265.531   
  Restricted log likelihood  –301.658   
 
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
 
 
The equation of primary interest is the second-stage probit entry model. Estimation is by 
maximum likelihood procedures as outlined by Greene (2008: 777–793), with the results 
reported in Table 13. Importantly, the specification of the model structure is supported with a 
statistically significant RESIDUAL coefficient. Additionally, the likelihood test rejects the 
null hypothesis that explanatory variables do not impact on bidding. Furthermore, the errors 
are homoscedastic. Finally, the model tracks the data well with 79% of the observations 
correctly predicted, and similarly the Ben Akiva-Lerman 
2 R  is 72%. 
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Table 13. Binomial Probit Regression Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
Category  Variable  Coefficient  Standard Error  t statistic  Marginal Effect 
           




  PCONC  –0.63299  0.74283  –0.852  –0.02624 
  SCONC  0.05186  0.70581  0.073  0.00378 
           
Assignment mode 
           




  EXCESS  –0.14448  0.12632  –1.144  –0.01011 
  WITHHOLD  –7.72095***  0.66233  –11.657  –0.54022 
 
Spectrum package attributes 
 
  COVER  0.83905*  0.50706  1.655  0.05871 
  DURATION  –0.05481*  0.02913  –1.881  –0.00383 
  FEE  0.33577  0.21786  1.541  0.02349 
  INITIAL  0.03261  0.12133  0.269  0.00228 
  TIME  –0.20170***  0.07272  –2.774  –0.01411 
 
National economic conditions 
 
  DENSITY  –0.00116  0.00082  –1.402  –0.00001 
  INCOME  0.00002***  0.00001  2.702  0.00001 




  RESIDUAL  0.13903**  0.07060  1.969  0.00973 
 
 
  Number of observations  141   
  % observations correctly predicted  79.43   
  Ben Akiva-Lerman 
2 R   0.716   
  Log likelihood  –60.691   
  Restricted log likelihood  –74.269   
 
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
 
 
Several distinct patterns emerge from the results contained in Table 13. First, the only 
national economic and mobile market condition variable that is individually significant in 
explaining whether there is market entry is INCOME (with partial effect 0.00001), which is 
positive. Second, for variables describing generally applicable (to both incumbents and 
entrants) spectrum package attributes, licence required geographical network coverage 
(COVER = 0.05871) is positive, whilst duration (DURATION = –0.00383) and the time to 
complete the required geographical network coverage (TIME = –0.01411) are both negative. 
Whilst these signs initially appear counterintuitive, this is not the case, and they reflect the 
finding of Section 5 that entrants generally win licences with more onerous conditions, e.g., 14 
 
shorter licence duration (DURATION) and less time to achieve coverage obligations (TIME). 
In this circumstance the reported signs are expected. 
 
The main interest is in the estimated coefficients of policy relevant tools that are intended to 
enhance the probability of entry, viz., entry incentives (PSCONC and SCONC), assignment 
mode (AUCTION) and licence availability (EXCESS and WITHHOLD). Interestingly, 
incentives offered on entry by NRAs are not statistically important. This outcome may be 
because either an entrant considers the measures insufficient in their magnitudes or ineffective 
because of the mode of implementation. Further analysis is required to determine whether this 
approach should be modified or abandoned. 
 
An alternative mechanism considered by NRAs to encourage entry is to control the 
availability of licences by either allotting more licences than the number of incumbent 2G 
operators (EXCESS) or by setting aside licences exclusively for entrant operators 
(WITHHOLD). The former policy stance is prima facie more market oriented (as potential 
entrants still have to bid in an ‘open’ process for spectrum assignment), whereas the latter 
approach is more administratively orientated (in that only potential entrants can bid for the 
restricted pool of licences). Withholding licences has the anticipated negative impact 
(WITHHOLD = –0.54022) on the entry probability. Namely, as only processes in which both 
potential entrants and incumbents can bid are modelled, setting aside licences diminishes the 
pool of potential entrants bidding for the remaining licences. This diminution of potential 
entrant bidders, in turn, reduces the probability of an entrant winning licences. Finally, using 
an AUCTION mode to assign 3G spectrum increases the entry probability (AUCTION = 
0.05162). 
 
Table 14 contains elasticity estimates for NRA policy tools. The reported elasticity values 
(evaluated at the sample means) are inelastic. The elasticity value for WITHHOLD (whether 
another licence is withheld for an entrant in the particular assignment) suggests that when an 
entrant is removed from the pool of potential entrants, the probability that another licence is 
won by an entrant falls by 2.46%. Further, using an AUCTION to assign 3G spectrum 
increases the entry probability by 1.15%, albeit only slightly. 
 
 
Table 14. NRA Policy Variable Elasticity Estimates 
Category  Variable  Elasticity 
     
Entry incentives  PCONC  –  0.005 
       
  SCONC    0.001 
       
Assignment mode  AUCTION    0.115 
       
Licence availability  EXCESS  –  0.387 
       
  WITHHOLD    –0.246 
 
Note: Bold indicates coefficient is statistically significant. 
 




Recently, empirical research on the assignment of spectrum licences is concerned with 
whether particular designs result in assignments. However, surprisingly, whether market 
entry occurs has not received attention. The reason for this paucity of research is probably the 
nature of the available data. Namely, these data typically do not contain information on 
whether potential entrants decide to bid or not, blocking the use of standard selection 
approaches. With the sample containing data only on bidders an alternative approach is 
developed that replaces the omitted independent variable with a proxy sourced from a count 
model explaining the number of bidders. 
 
The modelling approach is based on the premise that the impact of NRA policy tools designed 
to encourage entry have not been empirically tested to assess their effectiveness. Accordingly, 
the fundamental question this study addresses is: What policy tools determine the probability 
that an entrant wins a 3G spectrum licence? The short answer is that auction assignment 
processes enhance the probability of entry, while price and quantity concessions are 
ineffective. 
 
At first glance, these findings suggest that NRAs are not able to design spectrum packages to 
increase the likelihood of new entry, and that trust in auction modes of assignment is 
appropriate, but weak. However, the reason for the ineffectiveness of price and quantity 
concessions regarding entry is not resolved by this analysis. It may be either that entrants 
consider the measures insufficient in their magnitudes or ineffective because of the mode of 
implementation. Further analysis is required to determine whether this concessions approach 
should be modified or abandoned. 
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1 This free-riding effect occurs where incumbents as a group have an incentive to purchase 
licences, but not the individual incentive to ‘go it alone’. 
2 Western European NRAs were first to assign spectrum to MNOs during 1999–2001. The 
environment in which these assignments are made is shaped by the European Commission’ 
Directive 97/13/EC that states new operators should be encouraged to enter markets to ensure 
the development of European telecommunications service markets. In particular, the UMTS 
Forum argues that market entry is required to stimulate competition  and that optimum 
subscriber benefit is achieved only when competing infrastructures provide advanced and 
innovative services, viz., “...assessment of (3G licence) applications should take into account 
the benefits of allowing current operators into the UMTS market in terms of synergies and 
existing commercial experience, balanced against those of letting in new entrants whereby 
introducing new competition” (UMTS Forum, 1998: 11). 
3 However, if NRAs are to use reserved licences to influence market structure, they need 
perfect information about how much any potential licensee values a licence. That is, the 
inefficiency of allocating a licence to a low-value (inefficient) firm may outweigh any 
positive effect on social welfare due to market entry (Hoppe et al., 2006). 
4 Once again, if the NRA has only limited information about the potential licensees’ 
valuations, bidding credits may result in an inefficient allocation of licences which may 
outweigh any potential social gains. 
5 Beauty contests require MNOs to submit plans or bids including spectrum use plans. After 
hearing proposals, NRAs award spectrum to operators that present the most attractive 
proposals. Importantly, spectrum price is only one aspect of NRAs’ decision making. 
Conversely, auctions require operators to make price bids for spectrum lots. Thus, an auction 
is a competitive, price-based mechanism which should result in allocations to operators with 18 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
highest spectrum valuations (Cramton, 2002: 608). Implicit value calculations are based on 
operators’ projected future revenue and cost streams. 
6 Greece was the only country not to have made available an excess number of licences over 
incumbents. 
7 Further, the model is generalised for the case when the selection variable is not observed. In 
this case the selection mechanism is specified as a probability model to account for the latent 
selection variable. Another generalization is to allow nonlinear specification of the primary 
equation (see Greene 1992, 2006; and Terza 1995, 1998 for examples of the approach). 
8 De Silva et al. (2009: 14) argue that in pure private value settings, an increase in the number 
of bidders increases the winning bid value (competitive effect). However, as a results of 
lower profit margins for the winner, this depresses the number of bids submitted (entry 
effect). In the common value setting, due to the winner’s curse considerations, the entry 
effect is itself theoretically ambiguous.  
9 Private value is determined largely by firm-specific assets such as the value of the brand, 
whereas common value is determined by market circumstances such as market demand and 
technology. 
10 De Silva et al. (2009: 534) assert that the 2SRI method is first proposed by Hausman 
(1978) in a linear model context. Consistent 2SRI methods for specific nonlinear models are 
developed by Blundell and Smith (1989, 1993), Newey (1987), Rivers and Vuong (1998), 
and Smith and Blundell (1986). 
11 Cappellari and Jenkins (2003) argue that if the number of draws is greater than the square 
root of the sample size the parameter estimates are robust to different initial seed values. 
12 The cluster estimator corrects estimated standard errors for panel data type effects that are 
present, but omitted from the model. An LM test is initially used to test for heteroskedasticity 
(as recommended by Greene, (2007)). The null hypothesis of homoskedasticity is rejected for 
all model specifications. Yatchew and Griliches (1984) find that maximum likelihood 
estimators for binary choice models are inconsistent and the covariance matrix inappropriate 
under conditions of heteroskedasticity. Greene (2008) notes this test will likely detect other 
forms of misspecification if they are present e.g., unmeasured heterogeneity, omitted 
variables, nonlinearity or an error in the distributional assumption (Greene, 2008: 780). Given 
this, a safe estimation strategy is to use robust correction methods. 
13 McFadden’s Pseudo 
2 R  is calculated as 1 [log (model) / log (constants only)] LL   (Greene, 2007: 
E18-21). 